Motivated by the relationship between foreign ownership and firm-level performances in emerging countries, we select Vietnam's listed market as the context for this empirical setting. We find that there is a significant inverted U shaped relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances. The non-monotonic relationship is consistent with corporate governance theory on the gains from monitoring effects by shareholders or the losses from expropriations when their ownership exceeds a certain large level. Furthermore, we find that foreign investors disfavor firms with high concentration of ownership that relates to image of weak corporate governance. Lastly, there are also evidences that foreign investors are likely to invest in firms with good financial performances, large size, low level of debts, in pharmaceutical industry, and listed in higher liquid stock exchange.
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The study emphasizes more on relevant subjects of corporate governance, ownership structure, roles and impacts of certain shareholders, herein foreign owners, on the firms rather than aims at areas of investment valuation or investment strategy. The study contributes to current body of literature on the subject of foreign ownership in following aspects. First, to the best of our knowledge, this study may be one of the very first indications examining effects of foreign ownership on firm-level performances in Vietnam, an emerging country with nascent capital market and a least reached country for empirical studies in business-management disciplines. Second, we provide evidences that large foreign ownership in listed firms do not always associate with higher or more added benefits. The effects of foreign investors as firm shareholders should be thus evaluated with caution especially in environments with weak corporate governance and poor institutional aspects.
The study is organized as follows. Next section reviews the literature. Section 3 provides several features about Vietnam's equity market and foreign investor. Section 4 describes data and basic statistics. Section 5 presents empirical results and additional tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study.
II. Literature review

Foreign ownership and firm performances
Relationship of ownership structure and corporate value is widely discussed subjects in previous corporate governance literature. Classical studies of Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest benefits of shareholders with large ownership by providing arguments that large shareholders have strong incentives to monitor managers, thus mitigate agency problems, which helps to maximize their firm's value. On the other hand, large shareholders can also relate to negative impacts on firm value. For example, large shareholders can pursue their own private interests that contradict those of other minority shareholders or those of employees and managers . Therefore, it can be said that the relationship between ownership structure and corporate value is an empirical issue (McConnell and Servaes, 1990 ).
In addition, previous studies also examine the effects of management ownership and firm value. Berle and Means (1932) indicate that managers with little ownership can deploy managerial control for their private benefits rather than those of shareholders. For example, the managers can pursue non-value-maximizing objectives such as empire building and sales growth at the expense of other shareholders. Empirically, Morck et al. (1988) find a non-"Foreign ownership and performance of listed firms: evidence from an emerging economy" -288 -monotonic relationship between management ownership and firm market valuation. The authors argue that managerial ownership relates to higher firm market performance, but after a certain point of ownership, the managers become entrenched and execute decisions that are not for the benefit of other shareholders. Furthermore, McConnell and Servaes (1990) provide supporting evidences for the non-monotonic relationship by suggesting that there is a curvilinear relationship between ownership by corporate insiders and firm value. Firm value increases until the insider ownership reaches 40%-50%, then after the levels, firm value decreases. Alltogether, Vishny (1986, 1997) Going into detail, Khanna and Palepu (1999) examine roles of foreign investors in India, an emerging economy. The authors discuss several aspects of India, particularly focusing on the lack of monitoring mechanism in the country's market. They find that foreign investors play valuable monitoring roles in their research context. In addition, Ferris and Park (2005) find that there is a curvilinear relation between firm value and the percentage of equity owned by foreign investors in Japan. Firm value raises and then declines after foreign ownership reaches approximately 40%. Relying on previous corporate governance theory, Ferris and Park (2005) argue that manager-owner foreigners with their increased ownership may relate to entrenchment effects and act toward their managerial benefits against those of other shareholders. Also using data from Japan, Nakano and Nguyen (2012) (2) find positive linear (2) In their study, it is possible to observe that foreign investors are generally non-controlling shareholders in majority of Japanese firms. may overestimate the impacts of foreign ownership to the firm, which thus can be a serious matter when conducting research on the subject of foreign ownership.
Determinants of foreign ownership
Khanna and Palepu (1999) find that foreign investors are less likely to invest in firm groups that have weak corporate governance. Consistent to this argument, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) suggest that investors who enjoy only security benefits are reluctant to hold stocks in firms that show weak corporate governance and high probability of private benefit extraction. Indeed, questions of which firm characteristics determine level of foreign ownership are received attention from firm managers, market regulators and researchers, especially in emerging countries with newly-opened market. In their well-known study, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) examine determinants of ownership structure in firm. Their study suggests that size and value of the firm, shareholder's intention to control the firm, regulations (risks) and nature of industry are determinants affecting the ownership structure of the firm.
Interestingly, their study does not reveal any relationship between foreign ownership and 
III. Overview of Vietnam equity market and foreign investor
Vietnamese securities market was officially inaugurated after the establishment of 
HSBC (2012) 
Definition and use of firm performances
We use Tobin's Q that reflects firm growth opportunities as a measurement of marketbased performance. The Tobin's Q (7) 
Calculation of weighted foreign ownership index
We follow comparing to market portfolio; inconstant, positive index implies that foreign investors invest less in firm i relative to market portfolio. Alltogether, apart from normal foreign ownership (7) See Chung and Pruitt (1994) for more details of Tobin's Q estimations.
Summary Statistics
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-294 -ratio, we use the weighted foreign ownership index as an additional ratio in robustness check as it can further examine the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of all variables in the sample. More detail of foreign ownership will be shown in Table 2 . Important information of the Table 1 The regression model is as follows. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Results of Table 3 show that there is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances at 1% level. Except for results of Model 4, other results are significant and similar for both normal and weighted foreign ownership. Particularly, the significant and positive (negative) signs of estimated coefficients of foreign ownership (its squared term) variables in all other five Models indicate that the foreign-ownership and performance relationship exists in an inverted U shaped form. The results suggest that firm performances become better along side with the increase in level of foreign ownership, but when foreign ownership exceeds a turning point (8) , firm performances start decreasing.
The turning points are considered optimal ownership level of foreign investors in the market context. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
In addition to Table 3 , we also use the weighted foreign ownership ratio as an alternative "Foreign ownership and performance of listed firms: evidence from an emerging economy"
-299 -measurement of foreign shareholdings. Table 4 shows the relationship between valueweighted foreign ownership and firm performances. The results are less significant in the case of ROA, but remain strongly significant and similar to the results of Table 4 expropriations toward their private benefits, going against firm efficiency (9) . Particularly, (9) There may be another interpretation that the negative relationship between firm performance and large foreign shareholdings resulted from a fact that foreign investors undertake investments into poorperforming firms through M&A. Therefore, underperformance of the firm is not necessarily resulted from the impacts of foreign investors. Although, we checked announcements of publicly available M&A deals in the market and found almost no evidences on the issue, we take the interpretation into special consideration for further study of the topic. the relationship will become more severe in environments with poor shareholder protection mechanisms. The results provide implications for market regulators and firm managers to take the best advantages of monitoring effects of foreign shareholdings (10) as well as to improve the corporate governance practices at market -firm levels to mitigate the negative impacts of potential expropriation by controlling (foreign) shareholders.
Further discussion of the results
There is a concern that if ownership by foreigners is held by various minority foreign investors, it would be very difficult for some foreign shareholders with minority stake to have any influence on the behavior of invested firms. In fact, there is no evidence that foreign shareholders pursue collective actions or behave similarly in the real market context.
Therefore, the interpretation of the empirical results will become weak if the concern cannot be probably justified. Taking the concern into careful consideration, we examine whether the ownership by foreigners are held by one large owner, or instead, by a collection of minority foreign investors. If the ownership is held by one large foreign investor, we may be able to presume they have the power for entrenchment. We select a list of listed firms in the sample that have larger than 30% of foreign ownership. The cut-off level of 30% is decided based on the turning point (31%-32%) of the inverted U shaped form found in the paper. And then, we check identities and ownership of major shareholders of listed firms in the list. We find that in nearly most of the cases, the largest (or second largest) shareholder of those firms is a foreign entity.
Foreigner as the second largest shareholder is recorded in few firms which have very high level of government ownership. The ownership information indicates that ownership held by one foreign entity in the firms with larger than 30% of foreign ownership is relatively high. According to financial regulations in the market, shareholder with 10% ownership can exercise certain power to influence several important aspects of invested firms. Holding majority stake of at least (10) As described in Table 2 , 75% of listed firms in our sample have less than 14% of foreign ownership, which suggests that foreign ownership generally relates to good impacts on performances of Vietnam's listed firms.
"Foreign ownership and performance of listed firms: evidence from an emerging economy" -301 -10% and being the largest (or second largest) shareholder may help the foreign investor facilitates conditions for entrenchment effects (expropriation) that weaken firm efficiencies.
Therefore, for those firms, even though the behaviors of different foreign shareholders vary toward firm's value maximization purpose and their collective action may not exist, the largest foreign shareholder among foreign investor group may demonstrate overwhelming majority shareholder rights to influence behaviors of the invested firms at the expenses of other shareholders. The realistic and analytical information on identity and ownership of major shareholders of high-foreign-ownership-level firms, to some extent, ease the concern that foreign ownership may be dispersed to various minority foreign shareholders, making them difficult to influence firm-related issues. It thus supports the paper's interpretation and implication on the negative effects of foreign shareholders after their ownership reaches a certain high level.
Determinants of foreign ownership
There are evidences that issues of concentrated ownership may mitigate investment attention of foreign investors (Dahlquist et al., 2003) . In addition, low transparency firm group reduces investment of foreign investors (Khanna and Palepu, 1999) . It can be said that current conditions of corporate governance and ownership structure of the firm affect foreign investment decisions. To examine the above argument and other factors influencing level of foreign ownership of listed firms, we continue the study by examining determinants of foreign ownership.
From the sample, we can observe that the ownership structure of the Vietnam's listed firms is relatively concentrated. There is generally a biggest controlling shareholder who has significant voting power to influence all decisions of the firms. The first one is the State with majority of government ownership retained in the listed firms because those firms are former State-Owned Enterprises. The other one is the founding family who keeps holding significant owner rights in the listed firms. For these firms, corporate governance may be weak due to the lack of an effective monitoring mechanism exercised by the second largest (or minority)
shareholders. Consequently, conflicts of interests between minority-majority shareholders, and between managers and owners of those firms become more severe (Claessens et al., 2002 ). Results of Table 5 Moreover, results of Table 5 also show that foreign investors seem to prefer large firms, which may be due to higher firm stock liquidity and higher market reputation. They are also likely to participate in firms with low debt, be listed in recent years, listed in more liquid stock exchange (11) , and in pharmaceutical industry. Overall, the findings are consistent with studies of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Kang and Stulz (1997) , Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) about determinants of foreign ownership and controlling shareholders. (11) Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange demonstrates higher liquidation than Hanoi Stock Exchange (HSBC, 2010).
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Additional tests
There may be argument on endogeneity issue because foreign investors may choose firm with good corporate governance to invest, as suggested in the previous section with an expectation to control for the causality issue. It is important to note that choosing appropriate instruments in 2SLS procedure is generally the most difficult or not always possible task because of limitation in numbers of exogenous variables in the sample or the lack of theoretical supporting evidences. Given these constraints, we consider to select oneyear lag value of performances which is already used in study of Nakano and Nguyen (2012) as the first instrument. In addition, we choose family firm dummy as the second instrument in our analysis. Panel 1 of Table 6 shows first stage regression that consists of (i) foreign ownership as endogenous variable and (ii) ROA (t-1) and family dummy as two instruments.
Panel 2 of Table 6 contains similar variables as Panel 1 but ROA (t-1) replaced by Tobin's Q (t-1). Second stage regressions in Panel 3 of Table 6 show that there is significant inverted U shaped relationship between foreign ownership and ROA (not for the case of Tobin's Q). In addition, significant results of Hausman tests lead to the conclusion that the foreign ownership variable is endogenous, suggesting the validity of the IVs. The results confirm our previous findings. In other words, firms with higher foreign ownership underperform those without.
However, the magnitudes of coefficients of foreign ownership and its squared term climb to a relatively unreasonable level, which should be interpreted with caution (12) . (12) As methods used in Second, for other robustness check (13) (14) of the empirical findings on the effect of the state or the family control, we use the ratio of shares held by these entities instead of their dummy variables. Since there are no sufficient data on ownership of founding family, we only use government ownership (and its squared term) as new independent variables. Table 7 displays the new empirical results. The results remain unchanged and significant at 5% and 1% level in term of Tobin's Q (consistent in signs of coefficients but not significant in case of ROA), supporting the inverted U shaped relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances. Lastly, we use Wald tests to check model specification. The significant results confirm suitability in the selection of the nonlinear regression models. 22.214*** 8.733*** Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this robustness check.
Following Ferris and Park (2005), we use different cut-off levels of foreign ownership (5%, 10%, 25%, 35%, and 49%) as independent dummy variables in the piecewise linear regressions to examine relationship between the foreign ownership and Tobin's Q. However, no significant results are found. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Furthermore, we also find that foreign investors disfavor firms with a high concentration of ownership that relates to an image of weak corporate governance. Importantly, we find that foreign investors prefer high-performing firms, which lead to a causality relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances. We use additional tests to address the issues but weakly significant results are found, especially in the case of firm performance measured by ROA. It may thus require further studies for the endogeneity issues. In addition, the identities of foreign owners may be needed for further investigation. Lastly, there are empirical evidences on determinants of foreign investment.
VI. Conclusion
The study contributes on the current corporate governance literature by providing additional evidences on the inverted U shaped relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances in an emerging country where there is rare empirical evidences on the theme. The results suggest that foreign ownership does not always relate with positive impacts and their effects thus should be evaluated under appropriate analyses. The study also provides implications for market regulators and firm managers to (i) improve corporate governance practices of listed firms for the potential reduction of expropriation risks caused by controlling shareholders, (ii) realize positive effects (monitoring) of foreign investors at either firm or country level, and (iii) further develop the country's nascent capital market by attracting more external funds.
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